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The coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has prompted much research on the possible
use of robots in different areas of intervention. One of them is related to the deployment of social
robots to cope with different needs elicited by and depending on the emergency. According to
a recent article published in Science (Yang et al., 2020, p. 1) “social robots could be deployed
to provide continued social interactions and adherence to treatment regimens without fear of
spreading disease.” In this context, social isolation and quarantine—often significantly prolonged
due to the duration of the infection—have plausibly exerted a negative impact on well-being
and perhaps mental health, whose jeopardy was even more likely if a previous psychological
vulnerability was present. If historically robots have been employed in dangerous and risky duties,
presently, some of the most promising domains of robots’ development also include rehabilitation,
caring, and educational and clinic intervention.We are witnessing a shift from the concept of “robot
as slaves” to “robots as companions, nurses, teachers. . . ” that, in a word, behave, interact, and work
“like us” (cfr. Marchetti et al., 2018). Yang et al. argue that social robots used to “adherence to
treatment regimens without spreading of fear” need to be implemented following sophisticated
human models, including mental states like emotions and beliefs, as well as the context and
environment of the interaction (p. 2). In our opinion, the “environments” are the affordances
strictly linked to survival in an evolutionary sense. The “context” is represented by everyday
life socio-material and socio-cognitive cues. Furthermore, we believe that the implementation of
social robots based on every possible human model cannot merely be the product of “a fusion
of engineering and infectious disease professionals” (Yang et al., 2020, p. 2). The model would
require an interdisciplinary perspective that includes also the contribution of psychologists. The
recent pandemic has in fact laid the foundations for rereading our daily relationships from the
point of view of not only human relations but also other agents, such as robots. In the present
Opinion, we therefore suggest that the use of robots is not only a purely technical issue but also
supported by important changes in the way we view relationships, particularly with those who are
close to us. With this aim in mind, we focused on identifying some psychological components most
subject to change due to the current global situation. Let’s take, for example, the emotion of fear
mentioned above. Fear will probably take (if not already has) a different form because of the virus.
Fear is a primary (Ekman and Friesen, 1971) and adaptive emotion developed through evolution
to enable coping with danger and ensure survival. Predators, contaminants, and invaders are the
potentially dangerous enemies that are all risky variables toward which close relationships usually
act as protective factors. In case of fear, the options for the individual are represented by the so-
called “fight or flight” behaviors. On the relational level, it is the search for a secure base (Bowlby,
1988), where a place can be found for reassurance and affective supply. This tendency persists also
in adulthood due to the transgenerational transmission of attachment patterns.
Marchetti et al. Coronavirus, Fuzziness Fear and HRI
Nonetheless, COVID-19 pandemic confronted us with a
scenario where “fear has no face.” Now, it also involves close
relationship partners, i.e., people who potentially are sources
or recipients of care. This profoundly contrasts with a series
of fundamental developmental achievements that make physical
proximity the embodied prototype of psychological proximity.
The individual undertakes a path in which the “known social
other”/“unknown social other” dichotomy acts as an organizer
of beliefs and attitudes, thus contributing to the construction of
the Self as a distinct and separate entity from the Other. From
a sensorineural point of view, the human baby is equipped to
recognize and trustfully orient herself/himself toward primary
figures of care and protection; it is precisely on this basis that
trust is built in others and ourselves (Di Dio et al., 2019, 2020a,b;
Manzi et al., 2020a,b). The so-called “anguish of the stranger”
(Spitz, 1945; Schaffer, 1966) emerges around 8 months of age. It
marks the distinction between the caregivers and all the others:
before becoming a neutral agent that the child will observe and
know, the “other” per se is perceived as scary (worthy of fear in
other words). This step appears to be in line with the older child’s
behavior observed within the Strange Situation (a paradigm
aimed at evaluating attachment; Ainsworth et al., 1978): the
response of distress and fear toward the stranger, who is generally
more accepted if the mother is at the child’s presence, and the
reactions toward whom are predicted by the security of the child’s
attachment to the mother. Later in life, the developing child
can establish attachment bonds with other people in her/his life
contexts: friends, schoolmates, relatives of the extended family,
teachers, and educators in various contexts, from school to sports
activities (Pianta, 1999). While the theoretical perspective of
multiple attachments postulates that the widening of the “known
social other” sphere is characterized by a differentiation of the
functional roles played by multiple relationships, it maintains
the fundamental developmental ability to identify the other as
a “secure-safe social partner,” distinguishing him/her from the
“risky-unsafe social partner.” The possibility to create multiple
attachments prevents a series of developmental risks and acts as
an enhancer of positive primary attachment relationships and
as a vicarious protective factor in the conditions of relational
affective fragility. Besides, not only are secure relationships with
multiple figures—with the teacher, just to give an example—
connected with the personal well-being within the affective
sphere, but also with cognitive performance at school, as well as
with socio-cognitive indexes like school climate, peer acceptance,
and so on. In order to exert an enhancing-protective role,
all these “others” (educators, teachers, relatives) have to be
perceived as “besides me.” The physical sense of “besides” —in
its literal meaning—anticipates in development, and continues
to support in the life span, the metaphorical sense of the human
experience of psychological closeness and proximity. And it
is precisely the impossibility to fully get the chances offered
by the different meanings of “besideness” (physical proximity
and security/safeness) that is responsible for the erosion of the
feeling of being protected from fear within the contexts of
affective bonds. Although technology allows us to be connected
even when physically separated, the experienced loneliness and
isolation largely reported during COVID-19 may depend both
on the technological inability to embody affective relationships
and perhaps also on more or less implicit awareness that “the
known social other” (also my caregiver, daughter-son-teacher-
girlfriend/boyfriend-teacher, educator) could be dangerous for
me. Consequently, the pervasive mood of close relationships
is no longer that of security but rather a widespread sense of
fuzzy fear (Furthermore, if people reflect on the possibility of
being an active agent of contagion for their beloved ones, the
basic emotion of fear should be added to the complex emotion
of potential fuzzy guilt). So, if in-group/out-group dynamics—
up to the attitudes toward the “stranger” in a geographical
and political sense (Antonietti and Marchetti, 2020)—are the
result of this primary articulation according to which “known-
familiar” equals to reliable and “unknown-unfamiliar” equals to
potentially dangerous (danger fromwhich—phylogenetically and
ontogenetically—the “known-familiar” is in charge of protecting
us), the effect of the fuzziness of emotions, and especially of fear
on mental health in a stressful situation like the one represented
by the COVID-19 pandemic, can be easily imagined. In fact, the
COVID-19 pandemic implies the possibility of indiscriminate
contagion by anyone, including those closest to us in a psychic
sense. Because of this, it undermines the dynamics depicted
above by eliciting an unprecedented form of fear, in which the
boundaries between safety and risk fall. If infected, it is necessary
to adhere to the rule of indiscriminate social distancing from
everyone. The same applies if a relative is infected. The work
of mercy to “visit the sick” cannot be accomplished, just as
it is impossible to extend the final farewell to those who left
us forever. In a word, COVID-19 has completely changed the
physiognomy of security/trust/danger/risk and fear, suddenly
destroying a bond that evolution and ontogenetic development
have taken a long time to build. The feelings of neglecting if
not abandoning the beloved ones, or to be neglected if not
abandoned by them to ensure the protective purposes of social
distancing, are not easy to be managed from a psychological
point of view; the experience of isolation, loneliness, and the
worry of being forgotten are difficult to explain and to make
comprehensible for children as well as the elderly. This is
to say that the erosion of the foundations of the distinction
between “known-familiar-safe/unknown-stranger-unsafe” could
vary according to the developmental phases of the individual as
well as the status of experts/novices. In terms of developmental
phases, the cognitive, social, and affective resources typical of
specific ages allow children to assimilate and elaborate differently
information about the virus, its effects, and the dangers of
proximity to beloved people. On the other end, if viewed from the
perspective of expert/novices status, which is partially connected
with the developmental phases, to have reliable information or
real scientific knowledge on the spread of the virus could help to
better manage the effect of the new form of fuzzy fear. Going back
to the role played by robotics within the psychological framework
briefly outlined here, the use of robots may change depending
on a series of factors that only the contribution of psychologists
may help to highlight. First of all, the “like me experience,”
which represents the basis of acceptance/refusal of social robots,
changes with age. Like the people’s sense of people (to paraphrase
Legerstee, 2005), also people’s sense of social robots depends
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on the development, as well as the aims and contexts, of the
robots’ use (Marchetti et al., 2018). For these reasons, it is
fundamental that the design of social robotsmeant to be deployed
in situations of “fuzzy fear” like the one we are experiencing
not only includes the purposes of assistance, companionship, or
tutoring associated with medical regimens but also takes the real
role of “fear-free” mediators of affective functions. In this way,
robots do not become substitutes for close relationship partners
from whom social distancing separates us, but act as relational
bridges between those who are separated for health and safety
reasons. As an effect of this rethinking the functions of social
robots in emergency situations, some current negative attitudes
toward social robots—from resistance and ambivalence up to
the uncanny valley phenomenon (Mori, 1970; MacDorman and
Ishiguro, 2006)—could significantly change. To pursue the goal
of designing useful social robots for the psychological needs
described here (i.e., coping with fuzzy fear and taking advantage
of robots as affective mediators), a deep, psychologically driven
afterthought will be needed around three basic axes of reflection.
The first two axes are more general. The first one regards the
psychological understanding of people involved in human–robot
interactions during a sanitary emergency in terms of level of
development, socio-demographic characteristics, and previous
experience with social robots (see the experts/novices distinction
above). Expectations and attitudes toward social robots may in
fact change according to both development and expertise. The
second axis regards the construction of social robots that are able
not only to take into account the needs of their human partners
but also to relate with the human agent in an understandable way.
This represents an extremely important feature that every human
would expect from the interactive experience. The literature on
robotics calls it “transparency”/“explainability” (Holzinger et al.,
2019), which would correspond to the experience of the Theory
of Mind (Perner, 1991; Wellman et al., 2001) in the domain of
human–human interaction. The third axis of reflection relates
to a goal that we hope to achieve in a not too distant future.
Specifically, it concerns the identification of the best way to
devise social robots that are able to sensitively manage and
respond to the behavior of a human partner with a possible
acute temporary breakdown in the ability to scaffold the sense
of emotional security—like some of us during this COVID-19
emergency—that is the very basis of Self construction.
The theoretical reflections discussed in this Opinion reread
therefore the question of fear in the light of a danger that poses
new questions and that, as is suggested, leads to rethinking
particular psychological and social dynamics. In reading the
new relational dynamics hypothesized in the present work,
from which the robot is spared, COVID-19 pandemics added
novelty to the physiognomy of fear, which (unlike anxiety) is
an emotion linked to objects and situational antecedents, and
which may therefore be affected by the nature of its objects
at the level of subjective experiences, behavioral reactions, as
well as coping strategies. These theoretical suggestions may
enrich knowledge from an interdisciplinary perspective, such as
robotics and psychology, providing important starting points for
future research by emphasizing which psychological components
should be investigated in people interacting with robots. An
example is the perception of in-group/out-group, as well as
the components of fear that, in our opinion, are mitigated
toward robots in the specific COVID-19 situation, which forces
us to adapt to the inclusion of new social agents devoted to
care assistance.
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